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effects, whose occurrence is wholly irrelevant to the success or failure of 
the action. 
A surgeon performs an operation which offers her patient his only 
chance of survival, but which she knows will probably kill him. If he dies, 
the surgeon has not killed him intentionally: for the sole aim of 'the 
operation was to prevent his death; if he dies, the surgeon's action has 
failed. I cannot be said to bring about intentionally an effect whose 
occurrence, though I foresee it as probable, is against my intention (see 
Hyam, p. 74). 
Matters are more complex if an agent makes some effort to prevent an 
anticipateci side-effect of her action. A terrorist gives a warning of the 
bomb she has planted. She intends, not simply 'to explode the bomb', since 
her warning increases the chance that it will be found and defused; nor 
simply 'to avoid causing death', since she could best do that by not 
planting the bomb: but 'to explode the bomb, if possible without causing 
death' ('if possible' meaning that she would not take precautions which 
would in her eyes unduly prejudice the chances of the bomb exploding). 
She believes that the bomb will probably cause death, despite her warning: 
if i t do es, has she killed its victims intentionally? Their deaths are no t pure 
side-effects of her action, since they mark its partial failure; this disting-
uishes her from one who is certain that his bomb will kill, or who takes no 
precautions against causing death: but, unlike the surgeon, it is not her 
whole or even her primary intention to prevent death. 
I shall not pursue this issue bere (but see R.A. Duff, 'Intention, reckless-
ness and probable consequences'). Whether we should say that an agent 
brings such effects about intentionally depends, I think, on several norma-
tive factors - the seriousness of the expected effect, the character of the 
action which causes it, and the adequacy of the precautions taken: in so far 
as we think the action unjustified, or the precautions quite inadequate, we 
may hold the agent fully responsible for that effect as its intentional agent. 
But we must now move on, to consider the normative significance of the 
distinction between intended and intentional agency. 
5 
Competing Conceptions of Agency 
5 .l I ntention an d Responsibility 
The discussion of intended and intentional agency in the last two chapters 
should bave served both to explain these two aspects of the concept of 
intention, and to show why intention should be the centrai species of mens 
rea. 
Intention is integrai to human action. Davidson has indeed argued that 
every human action is intentional under some description, even if it is 
unintentional un der others: if I bit you unintentionally (you get in the way 
of my expansive gesture; or I mistake you for Ian, whom I meant to hit) 
there is something I am doing intentionally - gesturing or hitting someone 
(D. Davidson, 'Agency'). We may doubt this claim: scratching my nose is 
surely an action, but it may not be under any description an intentional 
action. But human actions are none the less paradigmatically intentional or 
intended actions; and to understand what human agency is we must look 
to its fullest and most distinctive expression in intended or intentional 
action. 
Intended and intentional agency also form the centrai paradigms of 
responsible agency. T o act with the intention of bringing a result about is to 
make myself fully responsible for that result - I must be ready to answer 
for (to explain, to justify, to accept criticism for) my action of bringing it 
about; and I bring about intentionally those effects for which I am held 
responsible. I am also responsible, of course, for some effects which I do 
not bring about with intent or intentionally - if, for instance, I bring them 
about recklessly: but I am most fully the agent of, and thus most fully 
responsible for, those which I bring about intentionally or intending to 
do so. 
lntended or intentional agency as to some evi! is not, of course, by itself 
sufficient for either mora! or criminal guilt: that I bave killed someone 
intentionally or with intent does not by itself make me guilty of murder, 
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either in morality or in the law, since I may be able to justify or excuse that 
intended or intentional killing. Does this show that intended and intention-
al agency are no t after ali the paradigms of responsible agency? I t does no t: 
for justifications do no t deny responsible agency; an d the kinds of excuse 
which may exempt me from blame ·or criminal liability at least qualify, 
even if they do not wholly rebut, the ascription of intended or intentional 
agency. 
The distinction between justifications and excuses is not always clear: 1 I t 
will be enough to say here, however, that a justification admits responsibil-
ity for a fully intended or intentional action, but claims that the action was, 
in the circumstances, right or at least permissible. A piea of self-defence 
rebuts a charge of wounding not by denying that the agent wounded her 
'victim' intentionally, n or by denying responsibility for the wounding, but 
by claiming that that wounding was rendered right or permissible by the 
fact that it was the only way to ward off a serious attack by its 'victim' 
against its agent. One who justifies her action is prepared to answer for it, 
by showing it to be right: the possibility of avoiding blame or "Criminal 
liability by justifying our intended or intentional actions, therefore, does 
not undermine the claim that intended and intentional actions are para-
digms of responsible agency. · 
An excuse, on the other hand, admits that an action was not right or 
permissible, but claims that the agent should not be held (fully) responsible 
for it. Now many excuses deny responsibility by denying intentional 
agency. Pleas of inadvertence, accident or mistake, for instance, deny that 
the agent acted intentionally under the relevant description: the fact that 
such excuses deny responsibility by denying intentional agency thus sup-
ports the claim that intention is the centrai determinant of responsible 
agency. But other excuses seem to admit intended or intentional agency, 
while denying responsibility; and these may seem to undermine that claim. 
Duress and necessity might be such excuses (their status as legai defences 
is controversiat,l but we can discern the relevant points by considering 
them a-s mora! defences). Sometimes they serve to justify rather than to 
excuse. If I break the speed limit because a hijacker threatens to kill me if I 
do not drive faster, or to get a critically injured passenger to hospital, I do 
not need to excuse a wrongful act of speeding; I rather justify my action 
under a relevant description ('speeding to save !ife') which shows that it 
l See J.L. Austin, 'A plea for exeuses', pp. 123-5; C&K, pp. 319-25; Gordon, 
ehs 13.13, 13.23; G. Fleteher, Rethinking Criminal Law, pp. 759-62, 810-3. 
2 See 1989 Code, cls 42-3; S&H, eh. 9.6-7; C&K, pp. 246-68; Gordon, eh. 13; 
J. Biekenbaeh, 'The defenee of neeessity'. 
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was in that context the right thing to do. Sometimes, however, duress and 
necessity seem to serve as excuses rather than as justifications. If a captive 
betrays secrets under torture, or an impoverished mother steals clothes for 
her children, we might think that the pressures under which they acted 
could not justify what they did (they did not act rightly), but should 
excuse it; that they should not be condemned for giving in to such pressure 
since, as we might say, they 'could not resist' it. 
Insanity is another excuse which may deny responsibility without 
denying intentional agency: if, for instance, someone in the grip of a psy-
chotic delusion kills (with intent) the woman he believes to be persecuting 
him, he may be acquitted of murder on grounds of insanity. 3 
Both the meaning an d the acceptability of excuses based o n necessity, 
duress and insanity are highly problematic. What does it mean to say, for 
instance, that a person 'could not resist' some pressure; under what condi-
tions should insanity exempt an agent from responsibility? I cannot discuss 
these problems here: I do not think, however, that the possibility of 
excusing intended or intentional actions in these terms undermines the 
claim that intended and intentional agency are the paradigms of responsible 
agency. One who is excused on grounds such as these may have acted 
intentionally: the captive intends to give the enemy the information they 
seek; the mother intends to steal the clothes; the deluded man intends to 
kill his persecutor. But in accepting such excuses we also qualify our 
ascription of intentional agency: for these excuses deny responsibility by 
denying one of the conditions which such ascriptions normally 
presuppose. 4 
Intentional actions are clone for reasons, and the idea of acting for a 
reason is bound up with that of rational action - of acting for for good 
reasons which justify the action (see p. 49 above). We can say, more 
generally, that in ascribing intentional agency to others, an d in explaining 
their actions in terms of their reasons for action, we normally presuppose 
that they are rational agents: that they are capable of grasping and weighing 
the reasons for and against their actions, and of acting in accordance with 
what they see to be good reasons for action. Now duress, necessity and 
insanity, in so far as they operate as excuses, serve to rebut the presump-
tion of rational competence which ascriptions of intentional agency nor-
mally involve. Duress or necessity should excuse if the pressure to which 
the agent is subjected is so severe that it impairs her capacity to grasp, to 
3 See C&K, pp. 270-97; S&H, eh. 9.2; Gordon, eh. 10. 
4 See H. Fin garette, The Meaning of Criminal Insanity, ehs III-IV; R.A. Duff, 
'Menta! disorder and eriminal responsibility'. 
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weigh or to act on good reasons for action - to realize that and why she 
. should resist the pressure, or to carry through a resolution to resist it. 
Insanity should likewise excuse if and when it involves the serious impair-
ment of the agent's capacities for rational thought and action. 
This connection between the ascription of intentional agency and the 
presumption of rational competence gives further support to the claim that 
intended and intentional agency are the paradigms of responsible agency. 
In holding someone responsible for his actions, we suppose that he is in 
some relevant sense a 'free' agent; that he has, in the traditional terminol-
ogy, 'free will'. Now the meaning of 'free will', as a precondition of 
responsibility, is a matter of long controversy. I think it can best be 
explained, however, in terms of the concept of rational agency: an agent is 
'free' in so far as his actions are guided by his understanding of good 
reasons for action. 5 But if free or responsible agency is essentially a matter 
of rational agency; and if intentional agenèy is, paradigmatically, rational 
agency: then intentional agency provides the paradigm of responsible 
agency. 
This is why intention is the centrai or paradigm determinant of mora! 
culpability (at least for the kind of mora! culpability which flows from 
mora! wrong-doing). If I am accused of some mora! wrong-doing, that 
accusation is not substantiated merely by showing that I actually brought 
about some harm or evil (that, for instance, I caused some injury). I am not 
liable to mora! blame for every harm which I in fact cause: it must also be 
shown that I was morally (and not just causally) responsible for that harm 
or evil; that it can properly be attributed to me as my action- as something 
which I culpably did. Now I am, of course, blamed for harm which I cause 
recklessly or negligently: but I am most culpable, because most fully 
responsible as an agent, for harm which I bring about with intent or 
intentionally. To deceive you recklessly or negligently is clearly blame-
worthy: butto deceive you intentionally, or intending to do so, is a clearly 
more serious mora! offence; it is the paradigm of dishonesty. 
As with morality, so with the law. A defendant is accused of some 
criminal wrong-doing, and is convicted and condemned for that wrong-
doing if it is proved against her. But to justify that conviction it must be 
shown not merely that she committed the relevant actus reus, but that she 
can properly be held responsible for that actus reus; that it can be properly 
attributed to her as its agent. 6 A conviction for wounding must be justified 
5 See A.C. Maclmyre, 'Determinism'; G. Watson, 'Free agency' . 
6 See G. Fletcher, Rethinking Criminal Law, eh. 6.6-8. 
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by proof that she was responsible for a wound which she caused (that her 
responsible action can properly be described as a 'wounding'); and the 
most serious offence of wounding should involve the most culpable degree 
of responsibility, i.e. an intended or an intentional wounding. 
There are thus two dimensions to legai, as to mora!, guilt (see C&K, eh. 
9). One concerns the seriousness of the harm clone: homicide is a more 
serious crime than wounding, because death is a greater evil than injury. 
The other concerns the agent's responsibility for the relevant harm - the 
degree of 'fault': murder is a more serious crime than manslaughter because 
the murderer is more fully and culpably responsible for the death which he 
causes; he is unqualifiedly the responsible agent of that death- a killer. W e 
are concerned here with the second of these dimensions of culpability. 
The underlying assumption here is that criminal liability should, in 
principle, be ascribed in accordance with mora! responsibility. A defendant 
should be criminally liable only for conduct for which she can properly be 
held morally responsible or culpable; and the extent of her criminalliabi1-
ity (the seriousness of the offence for which she is convicted) should match 
the degree of her mora! responsibility or culpability (see R.A. Duff, Trials 
and Punishments, p. 41, chs 3-4). That is why mens rea should be required 
for criminalliability, and why intention should be the most serious kind of 
criminal fault. 
This assumption typically underpins legai discussions about the defini-
tions of particular offences, about the various species of mens rea, and 
about the status of various excuses: two out of many possib!e examples 
must suffice here to indicate its influence. Lord Hailsham argued in Hyam 
that the intention to expose another to a serious risk of death or serious 
injury is sufficient mens rea for murder, since, although that intention is 
'factually and logically distinct' from an intention to cause death or serious 
injury, the two intentions are 'morally indistinguishable' (p. 78): the for-
mer intention, that is, makes the agent as fully and culpably responsible for 
the death which she causes as the latter. And Lord Diplock argued, in 
Caldwell, that recklessness may be constituted either by conscious risk-
taking or by failing to give any thought to an obvious risk createci by my 
action, since '[n ]either state of mind seems to me to be less blameworthy 
than the other' (p. 352): either state of mind, that is, makes an agent 
equally and culpably responsible for the risk which he creates. Both these 
arguments assume that the law should distinguish two 'states of mind' only 
if there is some significant mora! difference in culpable responsibility 
between them. 
The assumption that ascriptions of criminal liability ought to reflect 
justified ascriptions of culpably responsible agency explains why 'inten-
tion', in something like its ordinary extra-legai meaning, should be the 
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centra] species of mens rea: but i t do es no t yet telJ us whether che la w 
shouid distinguish intended from intentional agency. 
If the Iaw shou]d be wholJy guided by ordinary Janguage, we might 
suggest that it shouid require on]y intentiona] agency for offences of 'basic' 
or 'genera]' intent, but intended agency for offences of 'ulterior' or 'spe-
cific' intent (see p. 40 above). For an offence of 'basic intent' need invo]ve 
on]y intention as to an actus reus which has actualJy been brought about; 
and we might naturalJy transiate that as requiring on]y intentionai agency 
as to that actus reus, since we can talk quite naturalJy of acting intentionalJy 
as to ( of bringing about intentionalJy) results which ha ve actualJy occurred. 
I should thus be guilty of wounding if I intentionally wound another 
person. Offences of 'ulterior intent', however, require an intention which 
'extends beyond' the actus reus of the offence: the defendant must act 'with 
intent' to bring about some further effect; and we might take that to 
require intended agency as to that further effect, since we taik more easiiy 
of intended than of intentional agency as to effects which may not occur. I 
shouid thus be guilty of doing acts Iikeiy to assist the enemy 'with intent to 
assist the enemy', for instance, only if I intend to assist the enemy. 
But the fact that ordinary Ianguage draws such a distinction between 
intended and intentionai agency cannot by itself show that the law should 
aiso distinguish them: for w e cannot assume that every aspect of the 
ordinary meaning of 'intention' and its cognates will be relevant to, and 
shouid be reflected in, its legai usage. Intended and intentional agency are 
'factualJy an d logicalJy distinct', an d that distinction may be of interest in 
some extra-lega! contexts (in explaining an action, for instance, we may be 
interested in whether the agent intended a particular effect or foresaw it as 
a side-effect of his action): but i t may no t mark any significant difference in 
cuipabiiity or responsibility; the two species of 'intention' may be 'moralJy 
indistinguishable'. Indeed, if criminal Iiabiiity is a matter of responsible 
agency; an d sin ce I am fulJy responsible for the results both of my 
intended and of my intentionai actions: then sureiy intentional agency 
should always suffice for criminal Iiabiiity; the law need never require 
intended rather than intentiona] agency. 
This certainly folJows from o ne conception of responsible agency: o n a 
consequentiaiist view, which sees no intrinsic mora! difference between 
'intention' and foresight, intentional agency should always suffice for cri-
minai liability. But a different, non-consequentialist view finds a distinct 
and particuiar mora! significance in intended agency: on this view, while 
intentional agency should indeed suffice for crimes of 'basic intent', in-
tended agency should be required for at least some crimes of 'ulterior 
intent'. 
Legai controversy over the meaning of 'intention' may reflect che con-
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flict between these competing conceptions of responsible agency: w e can 
clarify, if not resolve, that controversy by spelJing out the nature of these 
conceptions and of the conflict between them. 
5.2 A Consequentialist View of Responsible Agency 
I shalJ begin with consequentialism. The centra] consequentialist slogan is 
that the rightness or wrongness of actions depends solely on the goodness 
or badness of their consequences: an action is right if its consequences are 
at least as good as those of any available alternative, wrong if its conse-
quences are worse than those of some alternative. Consequentiaiists differ on 
what makes consequences good or baci. Utilitarians hold that happiness is 
the only intrinsic good, an d unhappiness the only intrinsic evi!: an action is 
therefore right (its consequences are good) if it maximizes happiness or 
minimizes unhappiness. Other consequentialists ascribe intrinsic value to 
ends other than happiness, such as justice or freedom; they assess actions as 
right or wrong in so far as they assist or frustrate che achievement of those 
ends. My concern here, however, is not with the particular standards by 
which consequentialists wilJ assess consequences as good or baci, but with 
the kind of account which they might offer of the proper criteria of 
criminal liabiiity. I shalJ not try to do ju'stice to the many, often very 
sophisticated, versions of consequentialism: but I shalJ sketch o ne influen-
tial consequentialist account of the proper aims of the criminallaw, which 
generates a particular view of the meaning and significance of intention in 
the criminal law. 7 
To a consequentialist a legai system, like any human institution, must be 
justified by the consequential goods which it secures (or the evils which it 
averts). She might thus favour the 'Harm Principle': the primary aim of a 
system of crimina] law is to prevent, or reduce, the occurrence of certain 
kinds of harm (J. Feinberg, Harm to Others). Now this principle might 
seem undeniable: what better aim could the criminallaw have than to serve 
the common good by preventing serious ha.rms which we would otherwise 
suffer? W e must, however, look more carefulJy a t the consequentialist's 
conception of 'harm'. 
What kinds of 'harm' should the criminal law aim to prevent? Most 
consequentialists, however they judge good and evi!, would probably agree 
7 On consequentialism generally, see S. Scheffler (ed.), Consequentialism and its 
Critics; J.C.B. Glover, Causing Death and Saving Lives; ].J.C. Smart and B. 
Williams, Utilitarianism: For and Against. 
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on a centrai set of 'primary' harms, the most obvious of which are death, 
physical injury an d loss of property ( each 'primary' harm generates various 
'secondary' harms which are harmful in virtue of their relation to that 
primary harm; if death is a primary harm, then being subjected to the 
threat, risk or fear of death is a secondary, derivative harm: see H. Gross, 
A Theory of Criminal]ustice, pp. 124-5). Thus, for instance, 'the principal 
end to be served by the law of homicide is the preservation of )ife' - the 
prevention of the harm of death (H. Wechsler and J. Michael, 'A rationale 
of the law of homicide I', p. 730). The crucial point about this reading of 
the Harm Principle is that such harms are identified as harms without 
essential reference to human actions as their causes; w e c an 'hope to 
analyse the idea of harm . . . without mentioning causally contributory 
actions'. 8 Death is understood as a harm, independently of what causes i t: 
it might result from human action or from natura) causes, but its character 
as a harm is the same in either case; one who dies from natura) causes 
suffers essentially the same harm as one who is murdered (although . in 
different cases one or the other mode of death might be more painful). 
Though such harms are initially identified independently of the conduct 
which may cause them, the criminallaw can prevent them by prohibiting, 
and thus preventing, conduct which causes them. It can do this in various 
ways: by prohibiting conduct which actually causes such harms, under 
descriptions which refer to those harms ('killing', 'wounding', 'destroying 
property'); or by prohibiting conduct which might cause such harms, 
under descriptions which refer to those harms ('causing danger to the 
lieges' (Gordon, pp. 837 -40), driving 'in such a manner as to create an 
obvious and serious risk of causing physical injury' (see Lawrence, p. 
526)); or by prohibiting conduct which might cause such harms, under 
descriptions which do not refer explicitly to those harms ('driving with 
excess alcohol in the blood', or 'having a firearm in a public piace' 
(Firearms Act 1968, s. 19)). We can focus here on prohibitions referring 
directly to a primary harm, and on homicide in particular. 
A prohibition on 'killing' defines a category of harmful conduct (con-
duct which causes death) as criminal - as the actus reus of an offence. But 
the law should not penalize ali conduct which in fact causes death, or hold 
agents strictly liable for any death which they actually cause: for quite apart 
from the fact that some death-causing conduct may be justified, criminal 
liability should require mens rea as well as an actus reus. To see how mens 
8 J. Feinberg, Harm to Others, p. 31: see ehs 1-3 more generally; also P.J. 
Fitzgerald, Criminal Law and Punishment, eh. Il. 
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rea might be viewed from this perspective,. h?wever, we must distinguish 
pure from qualified versions of c.ons.equenuah~m.. . . . . 
A pure consequentialist must JUsnfy her pnnClples of hab1hty by the1r 
consequences; she should adopt those principles which v.:oul~ m?st 
efficiently serve the law's aim of preventing harm .. Su~h a v1e': 1s (hke 
utilitarian accounts of punishment) open to the obJecuon that 1t cannot 
generate acceptable principles of liability: that i t would ~m pose liability .o n 
some who do not deserve it, for the sake of increasiDg the prevenuve 
efficiency of the law; that it provides no secure foundat.ion. fo~ the kinds of 
excuse (based on lack of mens rea) which should, ID JUStlce, preclude 
criminalliability. W e need not discuss this objection her~, however: for the 
conception of criminal responsibility in which I am IDt~n~sted. em
9
erges 
more clearly from a familiar kind of qualified consequenuahst v1ew. . 
Some who agree that the primary aim of the law must be under.stood ID 
consequentialist terms as the prevention of harm,. b~t w~o are also lmpress-
ed by the objection that a purely conseque~uahst v1e_w :vould lead to 
injustice, qualify consequentialism by arguiDg that. JUStlce sets non-
consequentialist 'side-constraints' on the means by wh1ch we may pu~sue 
our consequentialist ends. The punishment ~f an i.nnocent scapegoat m1ght 
sometimes be an efficient way of deternng cnme and m1ght thus be 
justified on a purely consequentialist view: but it is forbid~en by the 
non-consequentialist demands of justice, which allow u~ to .pumsh only the 
guilty. A pure consequentialist holds that the en.d .Jusufi.es any. means 
which efficiently serve it; these qualified consequenuahsts w1ll forb1d some 
means, which might indeed serve the end efficiently, but which are them-
selves unjust. 
On such a qualified consequentialist view, whether the law .should hold 
someone criminally liable depends no t merely o n whether 1t. would ?e 
useful to do so, but on whether it would be just. That he co~m1ts wh~t 1s, 
in fact the actus reus of an offence (that he causes a death) 1s not by ltSelf 
enough to make it just to hold him criminally liable .(to ~o~~ict him of 
homicide): but what more is required? He must, we m1~ht IDltla~ly. say, at 
least ha ve had a fair opportunity to obey the la w - to av01d commlttiDg th~t 
actus reus: I can be justly convicted of homicide only. i~ I had a fa.lr 
opportunity to avoid committing the actus reus of hom1c1d~ - to ~~o1d 
causing death. This makes knowledge and contro! the two bas1c condm?ns 
of criminal liability: I have a fair opportunity to obey the law agaiDst 
9 See H.L.A. Hart, Punishment and Responsibility; C.L. Ten, Crime, Guilt, and 
Punishment, ehs 2, 5.1; R. A. Duff, Trials and Punishments, eh. 6. 
f 
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h~micide only if I know (or could easily realize) that my conduct will or 
m1ght cause death, and only if I contro] that conduct - only if I could 
avoid acting thus. 
This argument would justify the principle that criminal liability should 
~ormally dep~nd on a 'voluntary act', since it is unjust to hold a person 
hable for an mvoluntary act which she could not control. But it so far 
requires only negli?ence _(an avoidable and culpable failure to take care), 
not reckles~ness or mt~ntwn, as the 'fault element' in criminalliability. For 
I have a fa1r opportumty to obey the law against homicide if I could and 
should realize that my conduct might cause death, and could and sho~ld 
take effective _precaution~ against causing death; if I negligently fai] to take 
those precauuons, I can JUstly be held criminally liable for the death that I 
cause. W e ca_n, _however, develop this argument to generate a hierarchy of 
degrees of cnmmal fault, making intention the most serious, and negligence 
the least serious, species of fault. 10 
The deman? t?at onl:l:' those who had a fair opportunity to obey the law 
should be cnmmally hable makes negligence a minimum condition of 
liability. But justice also demands that we treat like cases alike (and differ-
ent cases differently). lt would be unjust to convict one who causes death 
negligently of the same offence, and subject him to the same punishment, 
as one who causes death intentionally, if there is a relevant difference 
between them; and there surely is a relevant difference between them in 
that one is more culpably responsible for the death which she causes than 
the other. 
An intentional killer knows that her action will almost certainly cause 
death; but the worst we can say of a negligent agent is that he could and 
should have realized that he might cause death. The death which the 
intentional killer causes is wholly within her contro]; she knows that her 
victim's fate depends on her action; in doing what she knows will cause his 
death, she chooses to kill him (see H.L.A. Hart, 'Intention and punish-
ment', pp. 121-5). The negligent killer, however, lacks such fully conscious 
contro] over the death that_ he causes: he does not realize that he might 
cause death; he creates a nsk, not the certainty, of death; he does not 
choose to kil_l _(orto endanger ]ife). Now if criminalliability should depend 
on the condltlons of knowledge and contro!, the degree of liability should 
depend on the extent to which those conditions are fulfilled. Since the 
intentional _ag~~t satisfies them to far greater extent than the negligent 
agent, her habdity should be accordingly greater; she should be liable to 
10 For an attempt to provide a strict!y consequemialist foundation for this hier-
archy, see A.]. Kenny, Freewill and Responsibility, pp. 85-92. 
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conviction for a more serious offence and to a heavier punishment. One 
who causes death recklessly falls between these two extremes of liability. 
He is less culpable than the intentional killer, since he is less certain that he 
will cause death (h e chooses to endanger life rather than to kill): but h e is 
more culpable than a merely negligent agent, since he does choose to 
endanger life (see pp. 153-4 below). 
This view of the criteria of criminalliability fits with a wider consequen-
tialist perspective on action and responsibility. If actions are right or wrong 
only in virtue of their consequences, our primary focus must be on those 
consequences- on outcomes rather than actions. What matters is that good 
outcomes should occur and bad outcomes not occur; for instance, that 
people should be made happy or not be made unhappy. Actions have a 
derivative importance, as the causes of good or bad outcomes: what matters 
about a lie, for instance, is not its intrinsic character, but whether its 
consequences are good or bad. 11 If actions thus matter as causes of good or 
bad consequerices (and if the requirements of justice apply to moral culpa-
bility as they do to criminalliability), an agent's culpability for some harm 
which she causes will be a function of the seriousness of that harm and of 
her responsibility for it; and she is responsible for that harm in so far as she 
has effective contro! over its occurrence. But she has such contro] to the 
extent that she knows, or could easily realize, that her action will cause that 
harm, an d could avoid that harm by no t acting thus: the basic conditions of 
morally culpable responsibility for the harm that our actions cause are the 
same as those of criminal liability; knowledge an d contro l. 
What shape might. the la w of h omicide now take? The actus reus of 
homicide will be the unjustified causation of death (by a 'voluntary act'). 
The mens rea of homicide will consist paradigmatically in the knowledge 
that my action will cause death: to act in that knowledge is to be fully and 
culpably responsible for the death which I cause; I should be convicted of 
the most serious form of homicide - murder. Lesser degrees of culpable 
responsibility will attach to those who consciously and unjustifiably create 
a risk of death, and to those who culpably fai! to realize that their actions 
endanger !ife: they should be convicted, if they cause death, of !esser 
offences such as manslaughter or 'culpable homicide'. 
On this view the intentional, not the intended, causation of harm is the 
paradigm of criminal fault. Conduct is criminal (the actus is reus) if it 
causes or threatens a prohibited harm; and its agent is culpable (ber mens is 
rea) in so far as she controls that conduct, i.e. foresees its harmful effects 
11 See T. Nagel, 'War and massacre', p. 54; B. Williams, 'A critique of uti!itarian-
ism', pp. 82-9. 
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and could avoid their occurrence: one who does what she knows will cause 
har~. i~ the paradigm ~f a culpable criminal. This paradigm includes, as 
exh1b1t1ng the same spec1es of criminal fault, both one who intends to cause 
harm (and is sure of doing so) and one who knows that she will cause harm 
as a side-effect of her action. l t can also include one who o intends to cause 
harm .but is unsure of success: for he acts in a way which is, in generai, 
very h~ely to cause harm, since he will act in the way which he thinks is 
most hkely to cause the relevant harm. But there is no difference in 
culpability or criminal liability, between the intended and the intenti~nal 
causing of harm. 
This o view holds for crimes of both 'basic' an d 'ulterior' intent. I am as 
culpably responsible for an actual harm which I intentionally cause as I am 
~or ac~ual harm which I intended to cause; so too, I am as culpable if I act 
mtentwnally as to a harm which does not occur as I am if I act with the 
intention of causing that harm. 
:Vhat matte~s about a criminal 'attempt', for example, is that the agent's 
acuon makes hkely the occurrence of a primary harm (such as death), and 
may also cause related secondary harms (such as the fear of death). But one 
who d_oe~ what he is sure will cause death does, knowingly, as much to 
make lt hkely that both primary and secondary harms will occur as one 
who acts with the intention of causing death: each is as culpable as the 
other, and both should therefore be convicted of the same offence. To cali 
this off~nce a~ 'attempt' would stretch the legai meaning of 'attempt' 
beyor:d 1ts .ordmary m~aning, s!nce in ordinary language I 'attempt' to kill 
only 1f l mtend to k1ll: but 1f one who acts intentionally as to some 
prohibited harm is just as culpably responsible as one who acts with the 
intention of causing that harm, as on this view he is, we cannot allow the 
contingencies of ordinary language to override the substantial reasons 
which make it right to convict them both of the same offence (see pp. 
192-9 below). 
The same point holds for any offence involving an 'intent' which 'ex-
tends beyond' the actus reus of the offence: for that intent will be directed 
towards s?me r~levant harm which the agent's action makes likely; and one 
:rho acts mtenuonally as to such a harm makes its occurrence as likely, and 
1s as culpably responsible for doing so, as one who acts with the intention 
of causing that harm. 
Consequentialists often claim in mora! contexts that there is no intrinsic 
mora! difference between 'intention' and foresight. 12 That claim applies 
12 See J.C.B. Glover, Causing Death and Saving Lives, eh. 6; J. Harris, Violence 
and Responsibility, pp. 48-55. 
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equally to the law. The law need onever distinguish, as to culpability, 
intended from intentional agency, or require intended rather than inten-
tional agency for criminal liability; its purposes are best served by the 
broader definition of 'intention', sin ce that ca p tures the relevant category 
of responsible agency. (Note, however, that this holds straightforwardly 
only if criminal liability should depend on the culpability of the action 
which constitutes an offence: if it should instead depend partly on the 
dangerousness of the agent, a consequentialist might sometimes see reason 
to distinguish intended from intentional agency, since one who acts with 
the intention of doing harm may be more dangerous (as being more likely 
to try again if h e fails) than o ne w ho foresees harm as a side-effect of his 
o h' o h )13 acuon. But we cannot pursue t 1s 1ssue o ere. 
5.3 A Non-consequentialist View 
This consequentialist view of responsible agency is opposed by a different, 
non-consequentialist view which finds an intrinsic mora! significance in 
intended action; a significance which depends not on its expected conse-
quences, but on the intentions which structure it. In some mora! contexts 
such a non-consequentialist will argue that an agent's responsibility and 
culpability depend crucially on whether he intended to do evi!, or rather 
foresaw evi! as a side-effect of his action: that, for instance, while i t is 
always absolutely wrong to intend the death of an innocent, we may 
sometimes justifiably do what we know will cause the death of an innocent 
as a side-effect. I shall not discuss such mora! views, or the 'Principle of 
Double Effect' to which they appeal, bere: but we can draw from them an 
alternative view of the legai significance of intended agency. 14 
W e can be gin by looking again a t the Harm Principle, an d asking 
whether we can, as the consequentialist claims, identify each primary harm 
in a way which makes no essential reference to a human action as its cause. 
What, for example, is the primary harm which the law of rape aims to 
prevent? 1t is surely a harm which is internai to the act of rape: whatever 
further physical or psychological harm the victim may suffer (and none 
need be proved on a charge of rape), she suffers a serious attack on her 
sexual integrity and autonomy; this is the harm which rape essentially 
involves. But we cannot identify this harm without citing an intended 
13 See M. Cohen, 'Questions of impossibility'; J.B. Brady, 'Punishing attempts'. 
14 See G.E. Anscombe, 'War and murder'; T. Nagel, 'War and massacre', and 
'Autonomy and deontology'; R.F. Holland, 'Good and evi! in action'. 
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buman action as its source: for only an intended action can tbus attack a 
"':oman's integrity. W e cannot first identify tbis barm as a barm, and then 
d1scover tbat i t is in fact caused by a buman action: for essential to tbe 
character of this harm as a harm is the human action wbich perpetrates it; 
~o non-human process could, logically, barm a person tbus. Centrai to tbe 
Idea of rape as an evi! is thus not the consequentialist idea of an occurrence 
whose cause could be either buman or natura!, but that of a buman action 
whicb attacks tbe victim; and tbat action is defined as an attack by tbe 
intentions with whicb its agent acts. 
Recklessness as to tbe woman's consent is, of course, sufficient mens rea 
for rape; a rapist need not act witb intent or intentionally as to her lack of 
consent. But tbe recklessness wbicb makes a man a rapist is, we sball see 
later, a feature of the intention with wbicb be acts; the vicious cbaracter of 
that i_mention is integrai to tbe barm of rape. For wbat a rapist intends is 
~ot (mnocently) 'to bave consensual intercourse', but (viciously) 'to bave 
~nterc?urse purely for my own gratification'; an d it is in acting o n that 
mtenuon that be exhibits the kind of disregard for his victim wbich 
constitutes the essence of rape (see pp. 167-73 below). 
Now witb otber crimes tbere are obvious conseq~ential barms wbicb tbe 
law may aim to prevent: murder, wounding, tbeft and criminal damage 
cause sucb consequential barms as deatb, injury and loss of property. But 
the example of rape should lead us to look more closely at otber cases. For 
~nstance, is deatb (as a consequential harm wbicb we can identify as a harm 
md~pendently of tbe human action that may cause it) tbe precise harm 
wh1ch the_ !~w of murder aim_s to prevent? To say that it is implies that a 
murder vJctlm suffers essenually the same harm as one who dies from 
natura! causes (althougb a murder might cause more pain or fear than a 
natura! deatb, tbe reverse can also be true; and the harm that is essential to 
n:urd~r,_ wbich is what concerns us bere, does not include pain or fear, 
SI~ ce _I t IS suffered by o ne w bo is murdered painlessly in ber sleep): but is 
th1s nght? 
Both the murder victim and the victim of natura! causes suffer death: but 
the_character _of the harm th~t they suffer surely also depends on the way in 
wh1cb t~ey d~e. O ne w~o . tnes to kill me (an d o n this view the paradigm of 
murder IS an mtended killmg) attacks my !ife and my most basic rigbts; and 
the harm which I suffer in being murdered (or in being tbe victim of an 
attempted murder) essentially involves tbis wrongful attack on me. The 
point is not that a murder victim suffers tbe same (consequential) barm of 
death as a victim of natura! causes, and also suffers the separate harm of 
being attacked: i t is that sbe suffers the distinctive harm of being killed by 
one who attacks ber !ife. The 'barm' at wbicb tbe law of murder is aimed is 
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tbus not just tbe consequential barm of deatb, but tbe barm wbicb is 
intrinsic to an attack on anotber's !ife. 
Tbe consequentialist paradigm of crime is tbe intentional causing of 
harm: on tbis non-consequentialist view, the paradigm is ratber an attack 
on anotber's rigbts or interests; and an attack is an action wbich is intended 
to do harm. Tbe paradigm of murder is not, as it is for a consequentialist, 
tbe occurrence of a foreseen an d avoidable deatb, but a wilful killing; an d 
tbe paradigm of a wilful killing is an intended, not just an intentional, 
killing. 
Intended, not intentional, action is on tbis view tbe paradigm of re-
sponsible agency. Human actions are purposive: tbey are clone for reasons, 
in order to bring sometbing about; tbeir direction and tbeir basic structure 
is formed by tbe intentions witb wbicb tbeir agents act. It is tbrougb tbe 
intentions witb whicb I act tbat I engage in tbe world as an agent, and 
re! ate myself most closely to tbe actual an d potential effects of my actions; 
and tbe centrai or fundamental kind of wrong-doing is to direct my actions 
towards evi! - to intend and to try to do wbat is evi!. Intentional agency is 
parasitic on intended agency, in tbat I bring a~out inte~tionall~ exp~cted 
side-effects of my intended actions; tbe fault mvolved m tbe mtentwnal 
causation of barm is likewise secondary to, and parasitic on, tbe centrai 
paradigm of intended wrong-doing. . . . 
I have provided only tbe barest sketcb of a non-consequenuahst v1ew of 
responsible agency bere: but its meaning an d sign~ficance c an be mo:e 
easily sbown by applying it to some particular lega!Iss_ues, as I shall_ d~ m 
P art II; an d w e sball see tben ho w i t can justify tbe cla1m that tbe cnmmal 
law sbould sometimes distinguish intended from intentional agency. For to 
ask whetber the law sbould ever draw this distinction, or require intended 
ratber tban intentional agency for criminal liability, is to ask wbether it 
should ever be guided by tbis non-consequentialist conception of responsi-
ble agency; and disagreement over tbe legai meaning of _'inte.nt~on', in s~ far 
as it reflects a substantial disagreement ratber tban lmgmsuc confuswn, 
may reflect tbe conflict between tbese two conceptions of responsible 
agency. 
In many cases, especially over crimes of 'basic intent', tbere is in fa~ t ~o 
practical conflict between tbese two views: for . tbe non-c?nsequen~Iahst 
will agree tbat in many cases intentional agency IS as suffiCient a baSIS for 
criminal liability as intended agency. Sbe will, for instance, count as a 
murderer not only one wbo intends to kill, but also one wbo kills inte~­
tionally by doing, witbout excuse or justification, wbat be knows wJll 
cause death: w bile be do es no t direct!y attack his victim, be displays such 
an utter disregard for ber !ife tbat be is fully and culpably responsible for 
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her death. In generai, when what is at issue is culpability as to some harm 
which actually occurs, she will usually hold one who intentionally causes 
that harm to be as culpably responsible as one who intends to cause it;-she 
will not take the difference between intentional and intended agency in 
such cases to mark any signifìcant difference in degrees of responsibility or 
culpability. The two types of intention exemplify different kinds of culpa-
bility: one consists in a direct attack on another person, the other in an 
utter indifference to her rights or interests (intentional harm-doing thus 
involves the worst form of the fault involved in recklessness). But that 
difference in kind need not always, and in these cases does not, bring with 
it a difference in degree of culpability. 
In other cases, however, and especially over crimes requiring an 'intent' 
directed towards something beyond ·or other than the actus reus of the 
offence, the two views may conflict. I shall discuss two such cases later: 
criminal attempts, as a centrai example of a crime of 'ulterior intent'; an d 
implied malice in murder, which requires an 'intention' to cause serious 
injury (pp. 173-9, 199-206 below). In these cases there is a lack of fìt 
between the 'subjective' and the 'objective' aspects of the agent's conduct-
between what she intends to do and what actually happens: in crimes of 
basic intent, what she actually (objectively) brings about is what she 
intends or expects to bring about; but in these cases she either fails to bring 
about what she intends (as in a failed attempt), or brings about a harm 
which she does not intend (as in the case of implied malice). It is when the 
subjective and objective thus diverge that a non-consequentialist will attach 
particular signifìcance to the intentions with which the agent acts (two of 
the problem cases described in chapter l, Hyam and Cawthorne, are of this 
kind). Such a non-consequentialist view can also, I shall argue, help to 
justify the claim that I can properly be held 'reckless' as to a risk which I 
am not aware of creating (this bears on the other two problem cases in 
chapter l, Caldwell and Morgan): for what can justify such a claim is the 
relationship between that risk and my intended action (see pp. 157-73 
below). 
The discussion in these last three chapters of the concepts of intended 
an d intentional agency, an d of the conflict between two different concep-
tions of responsible agency, has not yet enabled us to resolve the questions 
or the problem cases with which this book began. lt should, however, have 
laid the foundations for a clearer understanding of those questions and 
problems. For we have seen that intention is centrai to mens rea because it 
is centrai to responsible agency: a criminal charge ascribes responsible 
agency as to some harm to an agent, and the paradigm of responsible 
agency is intended or intentional agency. What we have now to ask is 
whether the law should take intentional agency as the sole paradigm of 
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crimi~ally culpable ~gency, or sometimes take intended agency as the 
parad1gm; and how, m the light of these paradigms, we should understand 
recklessness as a further species of criminal fault. Before we turn to these 
mattérs, however, we must discuss another issue about the nature inten-
tion. 
